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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a divorce action.

Each party sought a divorce

from the other, and each sought property distribution and incidental relief.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried before the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson.

The first day of trial was held on May 31, 1979,

and the trial was completed on the 2nd day of trial, which was
August 21, 1979.

At the conclusion of trial, the Court granted

each of the parties a divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty;
custody of the four minor children of the parties was (pursuant
to stipulation) awarded to the plaintiff with reasonable visitation in the defendant; and the Court took under advisement the
other issues pending submission of memoranda.

With respect to

the issues thus determined, the Court entered Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law (R67-70) and a Decree of Divorce (R77,78) on
September 14, 1979.

In accordance with the Court's prior deter-

mination, the Decree awarded each of the parties a divorce,
awarded custody of the children to the plaintiff, subject to
reasonable visitation in the defendant, directed that the foregoing provisions be final on entry, and noted that all other
issues had been taken under advisement.
Thereafter, on October 5, 1979, the Court filed its
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l

Memorandum Decision (R98-100), and proposed Findings, Conclusions

t

were then prepared (RlSJ,158)

i

each of the parties having there-

tofore submitted memoranda as requested by the Court at the trial
(Rl04-119) and (R49-63), and both parties filed motions objecting
thereto.

Defendant's objections are found at Rl46-148 and Rl63-

164, and plaintiff's objections are found at RlSl-152.

A hearing

was had on these objections on October 16, 1979, (RISO) and the
Court directed that the defendant submit a written memorandum in
support of her position by October 19 and that the plaintiff
respond

thereto by October 26.

The defendant submitted her

Memorandum on October 23, 1979 (an extension having b,een granted)
(Rl76-180) with a proffered Affidavit (Rl82-190).

Plaintiff filed

his response October 26, 1979, {Rl65-172) along with a Motion to
Strike the aforesaid Affidavit (Rl73-4) .

The matter was then

argued orally on October 29, 1979, and the Court took the objections under advisement.

(The Court disregarded said affidavit (R288-9))

The Court thereupon entered an Amendment to Memorandum
Decision on December 14, 1979 (Rl91-92).

Thereupon the Supple-

mental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on
January 15, 1980 (R220-225), in accordance with the Court's
Memorandum Decision (R98-100) as amended (Rl91-192), and a
Supplemental Decree entered the same date (R226-230) .
The Supplemental Decree granted plaintiff the following
property, to-wit:

Furniture - $3, 000; automobile (van) - $6,000;

savings account - $488.76; checking account - $200; and other
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miscellaneous personal and business property.

The Court awarded

the home to the plaintiff, subject to a $13,500 lien in favor of
the defendant, payable when plaintiff sells the home, ceases to
use it as a residence, or when the youngest child reaches majority, whichever occurs

first~

a vested profit sharing plan in

the amount of $124.57 and a vested stock plan in the amount of
$108.78, one-half the cash value of the life insurance ($5,032).
(The values are those found by the Court.)
The defendant was awarded jewelry - $4,000 and miscellaneous personal property.
mony.

She was awarded $1.00 per year ali-

She was awarded $97,320.22 cash, and she was awarded a

$13,500 lien against the house, and was awarded one-half of the
cash value of the life insurance of $5,032.00.

(The values are

those found by the Court.)
The plaintiff was ordered to pay the debts of the
parties in the sum of $7,310.45, and each of the parties was
required to assume one-half of the debt to the plaintiff's parents, which amounted to $5,102.50 each.
The Court stated in its Findings of Fact (Paragraph 19)
that:
"The Court finds that the plaintiff has sustained
trauma and medical problems resulting from the defendant's
injuries and condition as a result thereof; The Court has
taken this into consideration, together with the responsibility and the expense which plaintiff will have in raising
the minor children in determining what is fair and equitable between the parties." (R223) (Substantially the same
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provision is set forth in the Court's Amendment to Memorandum
Decision (Rl92).
Thereupon defendant filed a Notice of Appeal (R231)
and plaintiff filed a Statement of Points on cross-Appeal (R241, 242).
Note:

The sum of $97,320.22, the total net proceeds

from the malpractice action (after attorney's fees and costs) was
derived in two phases.

The sum of $85,346 was received by reason

of settlement with the anesthesiologist (R41,43) and is the sum
covered in the original Memorandum Decision (para. 8 at R99) .
At the time of the oral arguments on October 29, 1979,
dealing with the objections of the parties to the Court's proposed Findings and Conclusions, the second phase of the malpractice action had been settled for $21,000 against the hospital and
the Court duly advised (R255,267).
Thus the Court, in its Amendment to Memorandum Decision,
(Rl92) with the total settlement before him, awarded defendant not
only the original $85,346, but also gave her all of the net

proce~

from the second phase of approximately $12,000 (para. 1 at Rl91).
The final net amount after attorney's fees and costs turned out to
be $11,974.22 (R216,219) for a total thus of $97,320.22.

In so

doing the Court reduced the defendant's lien against the house by
the sum of $13, 500 to a total lien of $13, 500.

(In the said Amend-

ment the Court also increased the amount payable to the parents fro
$4,930 to $10,205, with each required to pay one-half thereof.

Thi

amounted to an increase of $2,637.50 to each party for this item.)

-4-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
In her appeal the defendant and appellant raises three
issues:

(1) that the plaintiff should not be awarded a divorce;

(2) that the defendant should not be ordered to repay to the
plaintiff's parents $5,102.50, or any sum; and (3) that the
defendant should have been awarded a larger lien against the
property than the $13,500 decreed by the lower court.
On appeal the plaintiff-respondent and cross-appellant
seeks to have all of the aforesaid decisions affirmed as far as
they go, and in addition asks the Supreme Court:

(1) to reverse

the lower court in awarding a lien of $13,500 to defendant and
contends that no lien should have been awarded to defendant;
and (2) asks this court to direct that the parties repay the
loan from plaintiff's parents in the full amount of $13,205,
(rather than just $10,205 as ordered by the Court) and asks that
this sum be repaid from the fund of $97,320.22 (or in the alternative, that each of the parties pay one-half thereof, or $6,612.50
each.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff takes issue with defendant's statement of
facts as being incomplete, inadequate and in some respects totally
in error.

For example, defendant does not even refer therein to

plaintiff's serious and prolonged medical problems, both physical
and emotional.

As to the effect of defendant's brain damage and
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psychosis on the family (and its resulting stress upon the lives
of the parties and the children) defendant devotes one sentence
(see page 3 of defendant's brief): "Defendant experienced some
difficulty performing household chores."
We respectfully submit that it is necessary for the
court to more fully understand the overwhelming problems this
unfortunate couple has gone through and which they still face in
order to reach a proper decision in this case.

We will there-

fore attempt to set forth a more complete statement of facts,
and we will attempt to note the errors contained in defendant's
statement of facts in the areas to which they relate.
DEFENDANT.' S HEAL.TH :

In May 1973 the defendant was hospitalized, and while
she was undergoing an operation, she suffered two massive cardiac
arrests on May 3, 1973 (R298-299).

Medical personnel were able

to sustain her life, but she was left severely mentally impaired,
and we will set forth a description of her condition as reported
by various witnesses at the trial:
Plaintiff:
The plaintiff stated that when defendant was brought home
after physically recovering from the aforesaid cardiac arrests,
that she did not recognize her mother or her children (R303); that
he brought home a totally different person, and that it took
approximately two and one-half to three years before she could

-6-
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speak full sentences (R303).

From the time he broug4t her home

until January or February 1974, she would mostly just sit and
stare and was of no help in the home (R304). She had lost her
former typing skills and was unable to carry on her former
acti vi ties ( R3 0 5) . She could not cook or do household chores ( R3 O4) •
The plaintiff stated that in about January of 1974
defendant exhibited psychotic behavior and was admitted to the
University Hospital (R305) where she remained for about one
month fulltime and approximately one month more parttime (R306307).

The behavior that prompted this hospitalization was that

the defendant tried to run away, tried to take off her clothes
and run in the snow and attempted to meet with imaginary people,
and to hide in the closet (R305) .

Defendant did not appear to

know who her children were and she would avoid them; for example,
when they would come into the room, she would go into another
room (R305).

At that time she was treated by Dr. Paul Wender

and was given substantial doses of medication (R306-307).

Plain-

tiff elected to bring defendant home rather than to have her
institutionalized (R306), but it was necessary to get a housekeeper to care for the defenfant and the children.

He obtained

Elinor Cheever, a registered nurse and friend of the defendant,
who came into the home to help and remained for approximately
four years.

Her expenses were paid by the LOS Church (R320-

321). With the help of Mrs. Cheever, the defendant learned to

-7-
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do the washing, learned to do some mending and housecleaning
and learned to assist with meals, learned to take care of herself personally in an improved way (R321) and also was able to
assist in taking care of the children (R322) .
During the summertime Mrs. Cheever remained in the
home during the day and until the plaintiff returned from work.
During the school months she came in the morning and helped with
breakfast and then came again in the afternoon and stayed to
assist with the evening meal (R322).
The plaintiff stated that finally the defendant
appeared to reach a plateau in her improvement (R360) and he
thought defendant would need care from then on (R362) .

She was

admitted as a patient at the Plantation Nursing Home in August
of 1978 (R365) , and she has improved in some areas while at the
Plantation (R364). Defendant ia approximately 41 years old (Ex.6-P).
Andrew Fisher, Psychiatrist:
Dr. Andrew Fisher, a practicing psychiatrist, stated
that he had treated the defendant since she entered the Plantation
Nursing Home.

His diagnosis was that she had organic brain damage

due to cardiac arrest or pschosis, or both (R413,414).

She came

to the Plantation Nursing Home with a history of not having taken
care of her children very well and not doing her day-to-day duties
very well (R414).

She became better in the nursing home, and her

medication was eventually reduced from 400 mg. of Meloril to 300

-8-
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mg.

(R414-415).

He advised that the improvement took place in

the structured nursing home setting and cautioned that if much
responsibility or much pressure were given to defendant, she
might regress (R415).

Defendant had difficulty when they

attempted to reduce her medication (R416).
Dr. Fisher stated that in his opinion she would never
recover to the extent of her former abilities, but was making
slow, but gradual progress in the nursing home situation, which
(he noted) was less stressful than at home (R416,417).

He

thought it unlikely that she would ever be off her medications
(R417) and that it was unlikely that she would ever be selfsufficient (R415,419).

At page 419 of the transcript, Dr. Fisher

was asked, "Do you think it also totally unlikely that she will
ever be able to function as a wife and mother of the family?", to
which he replied, "I think she could possibly function as a wife,
but I think she would have difficulty handling the responsibilities of children."
When asked whether he felt that the defendant would
ever be able to handle the physical side of the marriage, he
answered that that issue was speculative, but he thought that
there would be problems (R419) .
Elinor Cheever:
Elinor Cheever, a registered nurse, stated that she was
a very good and close friend of the defendant since before the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided
-9- by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

defendant's injuries (R440).

She stated that after defendant's

injuries, she was often in the home and determined that the defend·
ant was unable to cook or keep house and stated that it was much
like putting a child in charge of a home (R441) .

She stated that

the plaintiff tried to keep the family together (R442).

For the

last four years she had served in the home during the days and
occasionally at nights and was still caring for the children at
the time of trial.
In her employment in the Izatt home, Mrs. Cheever said
that she attempted to rehabilitate the defendant to a level that
she could be a fulltime wife and mother (R442) and that she tried
to be a model for the defendant in disciplining the children, in
running the home and in purchasing for the home (R444).

The

defendant made some improvement and got so that she could purchase items at the store (R445), but she was never able to drive.
She was able to make her bed and wash clothes, but never did
learn to iron or follow recipes, nor to do much cooking (R445).
Mrs. Cheever's work with the defendant was the most "difficult
responsibility" in her entire life (R446).

The defendant had

difficulty expressing love for the children (R446) and defendant's discipline was not appropriate and it lacked consistency
(R446,447).

Mrs. Cheever said at R446:

"It was not uncommon

really to see her snatch a handful of hair out of Camille's hair,
and she was a little girl without a whole lot of hair.

And I
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recall saying to Mary,

'There are better ways to

discipline~"c

She stated that the children had difficulty with defendant's
discipline and they appeared to interpret her behavior as
showing favoritism (R460).

The defendant was able to show

little affection for the children (R462).

Over the years she

has improved somewhat (R462) and particularly defendant could
enjoy humor again and seemed to enjoy life more; she also improved
socially somewhat and became more pleasant (R461) .
Dr. Paul Wender, Psychiatrist:
Dr. Paul Wender, a professor of psychiatry at the University of Utah, testified that he cared for the defendant from the
time she was hospitalized at University

Ho~pital

(she was hospitalized for approximately six

in January 1974

week~)

until approxi-

mately July 1978 (R449,450,452).
Dr. Wender's diagnosis was that the defendant suffered
from a significant degree of brain damage and extensive psychosis
(R450).

He stated that medication helped the psychosis, but the

brain damage was not helped thereby.

Defendant continued to suffer

impaired memory, impaired social judgment, impaired recall of
emotional responsibilities to her husband and to her children, all
of which the doctor stated indicated brain damage (R450,451).
He further stated that the prolonged use of defendant's
medication can cause brain damage in itself, so he tried to reduce
the dosage, but when he got below a certain minimum "psychotic

-11-
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halucinations would occur, halucinatory and auditory, and she
would display a bad social judgment, such as a psychotic basis of
hearsay injuries, the kids, physically going after them with a
baseball bat, or things like that . . . " (R451) .
Dr. Wender finally got her to a level of between 300
and 400 mg. of meloril per day (R452), and although there had
been measurable improvement, it was not substantial (R453).

He

stated that in brain damage cases; it is not likely that much
improvement occurs after two years (R453) although some improvement may continue in the area of her psychosis after two years
(R458).

Dr. Wender's conclusion at page 454 of the record (when

asked whether or not defendant would ever be able to function in
a normal capacity as a housewife) was as follows:

11

my

opinion is that she will never be able to function in that capacity."

When asked, "Do you think that s.he will have the ability to

care for the children?" he answered,
nil."

n

The probability, exceedingly

(R454).
Dr. Wender recommended institutionalizing defendant, but

realized that it was hard for plaintiff to accept that alternative
at first, and he had therefore had to present that matter of insti·
tutionalization of defendant to the plaintiff in a gradual way
(R454-456).

Dr. Wender brought in Dr. Lynn Clark as a consultant

(who had much experience with brain damage cases) and Dr. Clark
concluded that defendant suffered from loss of spontaneity, loss

-12-provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of emotional expression towards plaintiff and the children and
bad social judgment, and concluded that she was suffering from
brain damage (R453,454).
Kenneth Clark, Defendant's Uncle and Guardian:
Kenneth Clark stated that defendant had made some
improvement while at the Planation Nursing Horne (R470).
Christine Miller Ferguson:
Mrs. Ferguson, a social worker at the Plantation Nursing.
Horne (R481) , testified that the plaintiff had stated that he wante<
to institutionalize defendant because she was being disruptive at
home (R483).

Plaintiff told her that he did not want to upset the

defendant by letting her know that she was going to be institution·
alized permanently at the time she was first brought to the Planta·
tion, and she also stated that the plaintiff had told her that he
was not going to divorce defendant when she was institutionalized
in August 1978 (R484).

Mrs. Ferguson apparently took issue with

plaintiff's not being more frank with the defendant about her
admission at the Plantation.

In this connection she was asked at

page 501 of the record: "And whether the means of getting her
admitted you thought peculiar or not, you don't and did not then
and don't now quarrel with the fact that was an appropriate step
to take, do you?", to which she replied at page 502, "No."

She

stated that the plaintiff was very upset and under much stress
when the defendant was admitted (RSOO).

Mrse Ferguson stated
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that the defendant had made considerable improvement while at
the Plantation Nursing Home, that they had been able to reduce
her medication from 400 to 300 mg. of Meloril (R485).

The

defendant was employed in a program at the nursing home where
she assisted in the laundry and also worked at an inquiry center
in a job similar to a librarian and had done some staff baby
sitting (R485,486).

Present plans for defendant called for her

to begin secretarial training at Trade Tech in September 1979
(R486); that although her skill levels were low, the defendant
was making progress in her typing skills, working on her memory
and her budgeting skills and stated that her memory had improved
and her grooming practices and sociability has improved (R486).
Mrs. Ferguson did not recommend that the defendant leave
the nursing home as of that time (R487) and in fact statedatR487
that she didn't think that she would ever be able to leave the
nursing home, but felt that she could be trained to become "capable
of earning a livelihood " (R487), but stated that there was some
question about her earning ability (R487).
PLAINTIFF'S HEALTH:
Plaintiff:
Plaintiff testified that he had been hospitalized in
1974, 1975 and 1979 with ulcer and stomach problems (R327), and
that tension, worry and concern had led to removal of his stomach.
(R327)

-14-
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David L. Egli, M.D.:
Dr. David L. Egli, a psychiatrist, testified that he
first saw plaintiff when plaintiff was hospitalized for gastric
problems in April 1979.

Plainttff was suffering from depression

and Dr. Egli administered anti-depressant medication.

Shortly

thereafter, due to an adverse reaction to this medication, he
had to hospitalize the plaintiff (R344,345l.
plaintiff's condition as reactive depression.

Dr. Egli diagnosed
Plaintiff probably

had a tendency for deprsssion, he said, but his condition was
caused "especially by stress situations that he had undergone in
the past few years."

(R346).

Dr. Egli further stated that these stresses not only
cause depression and the nervous condition which he observed in
plaintiff, but also likely manifested themselves in plaintiffis
physical ailments as well (R346).

Dr. Egli felt that the granting

of a divorce in this case would probably result in an improvement
of plaintiff's depression and anxiety (R347), and he stated that
plaintiff suffered from ari "ongoing condition characterized by a
sense of inadequacy, depression, helplessness, so forth,"

(R349)

and he felt that six months' psychiatric treatment would be necessary to overcome this problem (R347,349).

Dr. Egli stated that

he did not see evidence of the existence of these conditions prior
to defendant's illness, except that he felt that plaintiff might
have a "tendency" for such problems (R350).

Dr. Egli had recom-
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mended family therapy for the children at the LDS Hospital Outpatient Psychiatric Department (R348).
Ralph L. Tingey, M.D., Internist:
Dr. Ralph E. Tingey, a specialist in internal medicine,
(R352) stated that he had treated plaintiff for approximately five
-and o~e-half years (R352) and had hospitalized plaintiff for duodenopeptic ulcer in 1974 (R353).

Dr. Tingey had hospitalized the

plaintiff in 1975 for abdominal pain and had determined at that
time that the pain was not organic in nature, but rather "psychophysiologica~"

in nature and had referred plaintiff to psychia.;..

trist, Robert Burgoyne (R354).

Dr. Tingey also saw plaintiff in

1979 as a consultant to Dr.· McAllister, a surgeon.

Plaintiff was

then complaining of abdominal pain (R354) and it was determined
at that time that plaintiff had "functional bowel obstruction due
to emotional psychological problems causing the pain."

(R355).

Dr.

Tingey further stated that he had seen plaintiff from August 1975
to April 1979 (other than in connection with said hospitalizations)
for "abdominal pain, diarrhea and functional bowel complaints."
(R355).

Dr. Tingey stated that plaintiff had had most of his

stomach removed in 1974 by Dr.
ulcer.

McAllister because of duodenal

Dr. Tingey felt that the operation cured the ulcer per

se, but stated that the plaintiff has had ulcer syndrome since
that time, particularly what he described as a "dumping syndrome'~
(R356) and he stated that dumping syndrome meant: " .

.

. because

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
-16Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the rerouting of the food stream in the intestinal tract,
food would dump quickly from his stomach into the intestinal
tract.

This is quite common,

and this disturbed him for a long

while and caused diarrhea.

And this is always made more severe

by emotional distrubance."

Dr. Tingey said the majority of the

plaintiff's symptoms had been due to emotional stress resulting
from the defendant's condition, and in his opinion the divorce
would help his condition.

Dr .. Tingey was asked on cross-exami-

nation (on the subject of the stresses on plaintiff): "If his
wife's illness is one of those causes and the divorce is granted
and he is no longer married to her, well, that will relieve some
of the stress, I suppose?", to which Dr. Tingey stated: "I think
that is right."
will be

gradua~

(R358).

Dr. Tingey said plaintiff's recovery

(R358) and he felt that plaintiff "probably will

always need some medical attention and care, although certainly
years of age (Ex.6-P)
not the kind he is requiring now.!' (R3.57) Plaintiff is approx. 40/
DEBT OWED PLAINTIFF'S PARENTS:
Plaintiff's father, Wilford Izatt, and his wife, Wilma,
had spent considerable time in the Izatt home after defendant's
operation and they advanced considerable sums of money to plaintiff and defendant:
Plaintiff:
Plaintiff testified that his parents had resided in
the home of the parties for approximately one and one-half years
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after defendant's accident (R304).

They would come on Monday

and remain until Friday or Saturday and sometimes would stay all
week (R304).
Plaintiff had to obtain money from his parents to pay
bills and obligations which arose because of defendant's condition (R312) or to pay living expenses which he was unable to pay
because his money was otherwise committed because of defendant's
illness (R313) .

Exhibit P-1 consisting of checks evidencing

moneys received by plaintiff from his parents was introduced and
received by the Court as showing support received by the family
from plaintiff's parents in the sum of approximately $5,105.00,
though the Court noted that this money was not necessarily
received by defendant individually (R314).

Plaintiff stated that

he was unable on his income to pay all his medical bills and other
expenses and was required to go to the church and to his parents
for assistance (R315), and he stated that his financial circumstances in this connection were aggravated by the expenses of his
own medical problems (R316).

Plaintiff testified that his parents

made clothing for the children (R316) and bought groceries fort~
family during the period they resided in the home (R308) .

During

the 18 months they resided in the home, they purchased virtually
all of the groceries (R317,319), bought some of the groceries for
the next four to five years (R319) and were still bringing groceries at the time of trial (R316).

Plaintiff has not been able
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to repay his parents any of the foregoing (R33St.
Wilford Izatt, Plaintiff's Father:
Wilford Izatt, plaintif~'s father, confirmed that he
and his wife stayed with the Izatts for approximately 18 months
after defendant's injury (R400), and he stated that after the
first 18 months plaintiff's parents had spent other frequent
periods in the Izatt home and estimated since May 3, 1973, he
and his wife had spent approximately six months in the Izatt
home aside from the initial 18 months (R402) for a total of
approximately 24 months since defendant's accident (R402).
Plaintiff's father stated that he and his wife had_paid for
the groceries during the initial 18-month period after defendant's injuries and that the cost thereof was between $200 and
$250 per month (R401), and during the additional six-month period
of their stay in the Izatt home they had spent approximately $50
to $75 per month on groceries (R401,403).

Plaintiff's father

stated that the money was furnished to plaintiff upon the understanding that plaintiff would repay it when he could (R405).
There had been numerous small amounts under $20 or $25 which were
paid to plaintiff in cash and for which no record had been made
(R406).

Plaintiff's father stated that he worked in the home of

the Izatts painting, papering and doing general upkeep since the
defendant's illness (R406) and stated that he had painted rooms
in the house and had painted the outside of the house (R407) and
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that plaintiff had told him that the parents would be repaid
when plaintiff had the money to do it (R407).

He stated that he

and the plaintiff reached an agreement with regard to the reimbursement to be made by virtue of the painting, to-wit, the sum
of $1,500 (R410).

Plaintiff's father also insulated the house

and put sheet rock in the basement (R429) , but no: special discussion of repayment of these items was ever had (R430).

Shortly

before Mary's illness he had loaned plaintiff $3,000 for dental
expenses (R430,431,434).
The Court stated that with respect to the loans of the
plaintiff's father to plaintiff, he was admitting tnat testimony
on the basis that the money went for family expenses of plaintiff,
defendant and the children, although the testimony indicated that
the agreements to repay were between plaintiff and his father
only (R437,438)
While in the home, in addition to caring for defendant
and the children, plaintiff's parents did the cooking and laundry
and assisted in general housekeeping (R400) .
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE:
Plaintiff's grounds for divorce in this case were the
defendant's lack of affection for him and the children and the
defendant's erratic behavior, causing such emotional and physical
stress that he could no longer continue in the marriage.

One

aspect of this stress was stress brought on by the deteriorating
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condition of the children because of their mother's condition.
Counsel for plaintiff started to get into this matter as it
related to grounds (R324).

Plaintiff testified at R324 that the

children had been cared for by a number of different people to the
point where they were becoming very confused as to what was going
on

in their lives and where they fit into the scheme of things.

Counsel for defendant objected to such testimony, stating that
it "doesn't help or do any good."

(R324).

The Court thereupon

stated at page 325 of the record: "I think there has been sufficient grounds put in."

In view of that statement by the Court,

plaintiff did not develop the matter of grounds further as it did
not appear to be necessary and might indeed be disruptive and produce no worthwhile benefit, particularly in view of the fact that
the defendant was present throughout the proceedings. (R262)
It should be noted that defendant's lack of affection
for plaintiff, both emotional and physical, is noted numerous times
by other witnesses as set forth in connection with the section on
Defendant's Health (see pages 6 to 14 of this Statement of Facts.)
The defendant stated, when called as a witness, that
she did not desire to contradict or add to that which had been
stated at the trial (RSOS).

On the question of grounds she

stated that she wanted the divorce because the plaintiff "took
me away from my children."

(R506).

She did admit that she sees

the children on weekends when plaintiff brings them out and that
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she had indeed seen the children on the last three weekends prior
to trial (RSOS,508).

Defendant stated that before the divorce

plaintiff had shown affection for her (R506).
Defendant further stated that she did not object to
plaintiff's having temporary custody of the children (R507).

She

stated that she knew that she had incurred attorney's fees and
wanted·an award of attorney's fees

(R507); she wanted the child-

ren when she was well enough (R507); she wanted alimony (R507);
she wanted certain enumerated books and pictures (R507); and she
wanted plaintiff to pay the debts of the marriage (R508) .

She

stated that she wanted plaintiff to keep up the insurance (R508}.
At the conclusion of the trial it was decided that each
of the parties would submit a memorandum in lieu of oral argument
and in connection with that discussion, counsel for plaintiff
stated at R420 that: "My inclination would be to request that the
Court grant a divorce today and in effect keep under reservation
those items that are disputed for future resolution, and then in
effect we can start reconstructing their lives, and we would ask,
as we have asked in our proposal that the court make i t effective
today, or upon entry rather than upon any waiting period, and,
therefore, may expedite getting their lives reconstructed."
Defendant's counsel stated thereupon at page 521 of the
record:

"Your Honor can grant it now or else at the end of the

interlocutory period.

It appears that a divorce is going to have
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to be granted.

I,have no objection to granting it now.

I think

there is a big question on the distribution of assets .
(Emphasis added.)

"

He also stated at page 521 of the record: "She

does ask for a divorce.

I guess he asks for it, so, I guess, you

are going to have to make up your mind about which one it is to
be g;anted to."

The Court then stated: "My question is whether

it is her desire, whether it be final upon entry or final in three
months?"

Mr.· Hanson stated: "It doesn't matter to her, your Ho.nor."
The Court then stated at page 521 of the record: "The

Court does find that in this matter the plaintiff, Joel H. Izatt,
and the defendant, Mary

c.

Izatt, have both petitioned the court

for divorce, and the court grants the divorce to Joel H. Izatt
and also Mary

c.

Izatt jointly, and that the divorce should

become final upon entry."

Whereupon Mr. Hanson stated: "Upon

what grounds, your Honor?" and the Court stated: "Upon the
grounds of mental cruelty."
PLAINTIFF'S INCOME:
Plaintiff is employed at Evans Advertising and has a
gross income of $1,700 per month (R333).

Plaintiff's takehome

pay is $608.48 two times per month for a total of $1,216.96 per
month (R333), not $1,300 per month net as stated at page 4 of
appellant's brief.

None of the children of the parties are

employed (R377) .
In addition, at the time of trial the parties were
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receiving assistance from the LDS.Church.
this consisted of the church

Until August 1978,

paying for the services of Elinor

Cheever to work in the home at a cost of $4.70 per hour (R443)
and amounted to the total sum of approximately $22,698.89 (R463),
At the time of trial the church was paying for defendant's care in the nursing home in the sum of approximately $1,125
per month (R487).

Plaintiff's financial needs on a monthly basis

as set forth on Exhibit 5-P are as follows:
Description

Amount per Month

House payment (includes
prepaid taxes)
Maintenance (residence)
Food and household supplies
Utilities (including water,
electricity, gas & heat)
Telephone
Laundry and dry cleaning
Clothing
Medical and dental for children
(not covered by insurance)
Medical and dental for husband
(not covered by insurance)
School
Recreation (Deseret Gymn $28.48,
ski passes for children $65 for
about 4 months= $21. 67 monthly)
Incidentals (grooming, gifts,
tithing, donations, etc.)
Transportation (other than auto)
Au~o expenses (gas, oil repair,
insurance)
Auto payment
Piano lessons
First Security Visa
Mastercharge (Tnacy-Collins)
ZCMI
Total

$223.00
35.00
360.00
114.00
23.00
10.00
80.00
140.00
220.00
48.00
50.15
169.00
5.00
50.00
148.00
40.00
25.00
25.00
55.19
$1,820.34
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The foregoing itemization does not include any amount
needed to repay plaintiff's parents nor to repay the church.
regard to the indebtedness to

.
the

In

church, plaintiff stated that he

had agreed to repay the church for its assistance rendered by reason
of defendant's problems, and that he felt obligated to do so.
373, 379).

(R37l,

The church paid Mrs. Cheever alone approximately the

sum of $22,698.89 (R463) and other expenses of approximately $8,300
for a total of approximately $32,400.

(Exhibit 12-P) .

ASSETS:
For the convenience of the court we set out an itemization
showing on the left a list of the assets as established at the trial.
The middle column indicates those assets received by plaintiff, and
the right hand column those assets received by defendant.

(Values

used are those found by the Court and were not contested except as
to the debt to plaintiff's parents and debt to the LDS Church.)
Assets
House 474 K Street
$70,000 less $16,000
mortgage, $54,000 equity
( R3 3 2 I 3 3 3 ) ( 11-D ' 12 - p )
Cash value of life
insurance ($10,064 total)
(R464) ) 11-D I 12-P)
Furniture
( R3 4 2 ) ( 11- D , 12 - P )

Plaintiff

Defendant

$40,500.00

$13,500.00

5,032.00

5,032.00

3,000.00

Vested Profit-sharing
(R464) (8-D,12-P)

124c57

Stock plan
(R464) (9-D, 12-P)

108.78
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Plymouth van
( R3 6 8 ) ( 11-D I 12 - p)

6,000.00

Savings account
(R463,464) (11-D, 12-P}

488.76

Checking account
(R463,464) (11-D, 12-P)

200.00

Cash proceeds from
malpractice suit
(R222,476

97,320.22
4,000.00

Jewelry
(12-P, 11-D)
Debts - general
( R5 l 9 ) ( 12 - P )

[7,310.451
(see Note 1)

Debt to parents
$10 I 2 0 5 ( R2 2 4 )
(Plaintiff contends
this figure should be
at least $13,500 (12-P)

[5,102.50]

[5,102.50]

No disposition

No disposition

Debt to LDS Church
$32,400) (12-P)
Totals
Percentage of
total net assets

$43' 041.16
27.28%

$114,749.72
72.72%

Notes:
1. The aforesaid general debts consisted of a First Security
Visa - $492; Mastercharge - $256.52; ZCMI - $551.93; and $6,000
owing on the Plymouth van.
2.
In addition, each of the parties was awarded his (her) personal effects.
3.

$ 43,041.16
114,749.72

$157,790.88 Total net assets.

-26-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INTEREST:
Pursuant to a hearing on defendant's Motion for
Authorization to Withdraw Funds from the said sum of $ 97, 3 20.22,
the Court ordered that $15,000 of said sum be released to the
defendant forthwith and that the balance be invested at interest
pendfuq·disposi tion of this appeal (R4 34, 43 5) .

The said sum has

been invested at 11.892% per annum interest at United Savings,
and interest is accruing and will amount to $4,894 by October 24,
1980, and this is an asset available for distribution as may be
directed by this court.
At the time of the hearing of said motion, the defendant
represented, and in her written Memorandum also represented (R531),
that the defendant was then attending trade school and earning a
munimum wage under a federally-funded education program.
MEDICAL EXPENSES:
In her Statement of Facts defendant asserts that Exhibit
13-D indicates no payments for medical expenses or other expenses
relating to defendant's illness (See page 6 of appellant's brief).
It should be noted that Exhibit 13-D was not introduced at the
trial, but rather was introduced by stipulation after the trial (Rl02).
A number of the checks in Exhibit 13-D are medical in nature, but
plaintiff was never asked to explain them.

Many of the checks were

to banks, presumably for loans or advances, and plaintiff was :_not
asked to what extent those loans or advances were for medical
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expenses.

It should further be noted that the checks in Exhibit

13-D are only for the year 1979 (and a few for December 1978) and
so are very limited in scope.

Exhibit

13~D

is no basis for the

defendant's assertion that plaintiff had no medical expenses or
other expenses because of defendant's illness.

It is true that

plaintiff was asked at the first hearing concerning defendnt's
medical expenses, but it should be noted that he was asked no
further questions concerning that subject at the second hearing.
All documents requested of plaintiff's counsel by defendant were
furnished (R396).

We submit that it is safe to assume the Eugene

Hansen, counsel for both parties in the malpractice action, had
the most complete list of medical expenses incurred by reason of
the defendant's injuries, and those records were as easily accessible to the defendant as to the plaintiff.
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ARGUMENT
Under familiar principles this court can review both
facts and law in divorce cases, although the court will of course
give due allowance for the advantaged position of the trial judge.
Wiese v. Wiese, 24 Ut 2d 236, 469 P2d 504(1970).
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS JUSTIFIED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF

A DIVORCE FROM THE DEFENDANT.
The thrust of defendant's argument under her Point I
concerning the awarding of the divorce to the plaintiff (as well
as to defendant) seems to be that defendant was not responsible
for her conduct because of her mental condition.

We believe that

defendant's position in this regard is an extreme oversimplification of a very complex problem.
To begin with, it appears clear to everyone that a
divorce was necessary in this case.

Even defendant's counsel at

the conclusion of the trial stated: "It appears that a divorce is
going to have to be granted."

(R521).

It is true that the parties

had an ideal marriage prior to the defendant's operation on May 3,
1973.

It is likewise uncontroverted that plaintiff, from May 3,

1973, until he filed this divorce action in December 1979 (and
even thereafter as far as that goes) had treated defendant with
extreme kindness, care and consideration.

He has nursed her,

cared for her, assisted her in every way possible.

Elinor Cheever,
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the registered nurse who took care of the family for over four
years, stated that it was amply clear that plaintiff did everything he could to keep the family together (R442) .

She stated

at page 460 of the record that plaintiff treated defendant very
kindly and did all that he could and left no stone unturned.

She

stated: "He treated her, every time I was there, he always treated
her with loving, kind words and he made very opportunity to take
her and entertain her as much as she could be entertained, and I
think he did a princely job."
The strain of the situation created by defendant's condition made it necessary after approximately six years for plaintiff to make a decision for the sake of his own health and for
the sake of the children whose lives were being disrupted.

Dr.

Wender and others had told him that the defendant would have to
be institutionalized and he resisted this as long as he possibly
could.

He finally realized that it was necessary, and in August

1978 had defendant institutionalized.

At that time he had no

intention of seeking a divorce as the uncontroverted testimony
discloses.

By December 1979 the plaintiff had concluded that it

would be advisable to obtain a divorce so that he could get
remarried and bring a woman into the home to help care for the
children.
Prior to entry of the Supplemental Decree, plaintiff
did in fact marry Mary Ellen Fifield (This fact is not in the
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evidence as such, but is noted in defendant's brief (page 18) and
is not in dispute.)

This remarriage did not thus grow out of

improper conduct of the'plaintiff, nor is that claimed.

When

advised of the remarriage, counsel for the defendant said: "As
far as we are concerned, I appreciate that problem and I am not in any
way criticising Mr. Izatt for getting married so fast here on this
thing.

The children have got to have a home.

ties of this situation."

(R282).

That is the reali-

Defendant's counsel thereupon

expressed a willingness on the behalf of the defendant that the
home not be sold by reason of said remarriage.
The testimony was uncontroverted that the defendant
could not take care of the children and in all likelihood never
would be able to do so.

If plaintiff permitted the severe stresses

to continue on him, chances were extremely good that his own heal th
would break down, and upon his demise (or becoming incapacitated),
the children of necessity would be left without parents because
defendant would not be able to take care of them.
Thus, although the defendant postponed the inevitable,
he finally yielded to the overwhelming demands of the situation
and obtained a divorce.
When asked what her grounds were against plaintiff, the
defendant stated that he "took me away from my children."

(R506).

That appears to be the sole grounds which she asserts against the
plaintiff.

Notwithstanding that assertion, the testimony was
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uncontrovered that defendant was given liberal visitation, and also
uncontroverted that placing defendant in a nursing home was
essential, necessary and appropriate

(RSOl,502).

Although the evidence discloses that the defendant had
brain damage and psychosis, it also disclosed that the psychosis
was confrolled to a considerable extent by medication.

Thus, ev~

though defendant had severe impairment, she was by no means a vege
table and certainly had a significant degree of free agency in the
carrying out of her life and in her conduct.

Defendant's counsel

chose to have defendant sit throughout the entire trial, presumably because she did have capacity to appreciate what was going
on and to particpate in the proceedings.

Defendant testified.

In having defendant testify, it seems to us that defendant's coun·
sel represents that she has sufficient competency to assist the
court by her testimony.

Certainly, in placing her on the stand,

her counsel represents to the court that she knows the difference
between right and wrong as she was sworn to tell the truth.

She

testified in an intelligible manner, and she appeared to perceive
and understand what she was talking about.

She testified about

the property that she desired to have awarded to her, the fact
that she wanted attorney's fees awarded to her, the fact that she
was willing to let plaintiff have temporary custody of the children, but that she desired custody ultimately, and that she desir~
that plaintiff pay the bills of the marriage and keep up theinsur
ance.

It therefore appears clear that the Court was justified in
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determining that defendant had a significant measure of selfcontrol, was not without free choice in her actions, and that
some measure of culpability was inherent in her lack of affection
for the plaintiff and in her lack of responsiveness and affection
for the children and in her erratic behavior.
Therefore, upon consideration of the foregoing principles,
it appears clear that (1) a divorce was necessary, and (2) thatthe
plaintiff was no more culpable in this unfortunate case than was
the defendant, and even if the Court should conclude that the culpability of one or both of the parties is slight in this instance,
still the best interests of the parties and of the children will
not be

~erved

in failing to award a divorce, and we feel that the

Court exhibited considerable wisdom

in its decision to award a

divorce to both parties.
Where fault is substantially equal between the parties
to a divorce proceeding, this court held in Mullins v. Mullins,
26 Ut 2d 82, 485 P2d 663 (1971), that it was proper to award a
divorce to both parties.

We believe that this is such a case

and that the decision in Mullins should be followed in this case.
(If defendant were totally lacking in mental capacity, Section
30-3-1, UCA, 1953, would perhaps more clearly apply.

Where, as

here, defendant is severely lacking in some areas, but better in
others, its applicability becomes more tenuous.

That section pur-

ports to require two separate proceedings, one conditioned upon
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the other, which appears to serve no useful purposes in a case
such as this one.

It is perhaps regrettable that Section 30-3-1

has not been drafted somewhat more realistically as it might
indeed minimize the trauma in cases such as the instant one.)
Johnson v. Johnson, 107 Ut 147, 152 P2d 426 (1941),
cited by defendant, does not support her position.

It holds that

a physical condition alone is not grounds for divorce, but that the
conduct of one having that condition can be, and indeed was in that
case·.

It is ~efendant's conduct that gives plaintiff grounds in

the instant case.
Finally, more evidence of grounds could and would have
been introduced but for the trial court's statement that he was
satisfied on the matter of grounds
POINT II.

(R325,262).

PLAINTIFF SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED THE ENTIRE EQUITY

IN THE HOME.

In this Point we desire to respond to the contention
defendant in her Point III that the lien awarded to her

~

shouldh~

been in excess of $13,500, and in addition deal with plaintiff's posi·
ti on on the cross-appeal that no lien should have been awarded to the
defendant.

Defendant appears to take the position that the house

should be equally divided between the parties and she further con·
tends that at the same time defendant should receive all the money
from the malpractice action.

As we noted in the Statement of Fact

at page 26 of this brief, distribution as between the parties asit
now stands awards to defendant 72.72% of the total assets of the
parties and awards to plaintiff only 27.28% of the total assetsof
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theparties.

If defendant is awarded an additional $13,500 as a

lien against the home (making her total lien $27,000), defendant
will have been awarded ·81.28% of the total assets and plaintiff
will have been awarded only 18.72% of the total assets of the
marriage.

Perhaps no further argument is necessary to demon-

strate the inequity of that proposal.
Nevertheless, we believe the following should be noted:
Defendant has clearly lost sight of the fact that plaintiff, with
severely impaired health, now has the obligation to raise the four
children of the parties.

He has only modest income (he testified

that he has approx. $1,216 per month net takehome pay and that his
monthly needs were in excess of $1,800 per month.)

The inexcapable

conclusion is that it is going to be next to impossible for plaintiff to ever raise sufficient funds to pay out any lien on the home.
The primary concern in this case s.hould be the welfare
of the children.

They need to know that they have a secure home,

one from which they will not be uprooted.

An important factor in

their happiness is the knowledge that their father will not be
facing difficulties which he cannot handle and that his health
will not be further impaired, to the end that they may in effect
be orphaned before reaching the age of majority.

Plaintiff real-

istically is the only parent who will ever be able to raise the
children.

If the burdens placed upon him are such that he cannot

handle them and he breaks down physically or mentally, the children will indeed suffer, and they should be the primary concern
at this time.
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The defendant apparently takes the position that all
of the money from the malpractice action is clearly that of the
defendant, to which the plaintiff has no claim or right whatsoever.

We do not quarrel with the fact that the defendant has

been severely injured.

We do however think it equally important

to note that plaintiff's life has likewise been severely damaged
by this incident, his heal th severely impaired, and in a very real
sense, his life left in a shambles.

Furthermore, it is the plai~

tiff who has borne the burden of pursuing the malpractice action,
of assembling data and dealing with the lawyers over the six years
or so in which that action was pending.

It should also be noted

that the plaintiff was one of the parties to that action and certainly has a claim upon those proceeds.

We are not asking

fora~

of that money to be awarded to the plaintiff, but rather that the
equity in the home be awarded to him, the proceeds from the malpractice action awarded to the defendant (after payment of the
indebtedness to plaintiff's parents), and each party enabled then
to rebuild his or her life as best the circumstances permit.
It should be further noted that the Court has wisely
reserved the issue of alimony.

It is clear that with the large

settlement which she now has, the defendant has no need of alimony
at the present time (and alimony is not an issue in this action).
If at a later time the defendant should require alimony, however,
the plaintiff will still have to assume that obligation to the
extent a court may later determine it is appropriate.

If the
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defendant uses up the proceeds of the malpractice action and needs
further money, the plaintiff can be called upon to the extent of
his then ability in the light of his healthandother circumstances
to pay support.

(And of course defendant will presumably also be

eligible for church assistance and/or Medicaid.)
To award a $27,000 lien to the defendant in addition to
the sum of $97,320.22 is simply not warranted by the facts of this
case.
It is true that the Court has placed some conditions upon
the payment of the lien which tend to mitigate the harshness of the
award.

But those limitations effectively preclude the family from

ever making a change in their place of residence.

If plaintiff

can improve himself in his employment by a move of any kind, he
will be effectively precluded from doing it because as soon as he
moves out of the house or sells it, he must pay the lien to the
defendant and he has no funds with which to do so.

We acknowledge

that the terms such as those imposed by the Court are frequently
employed and often produce an equitable result, but it should be
noted that normally those restrictions are placed upon the wife's
use of the home as it is usually the wife who is awarded the home
in which to raise the children.

More often, if the wife moves

from the home or ceases to use it as a residence, it is because
she has remarried and her new husband has assumed financial obligations for her.
do not exist.

In the instant case, however, those circumstances

Plaintiff is the breadwinner and has the obligation
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to go where his work requires him to go.
If the court is inclined to feel that a lien is proper

in this case, we urge the court not to increase it in any way. A
lien of $13,500 is more than ample and is more than the plaintiff
will in all likelihood ever be able to pay.

To double that lien

as the defendant seeks is, we believe, unfair and unnecesary to
the welfare of the defendant.
The defendant has apparently attempted to make an issue
out of the fact that no interest is being paid to the defendant
on the money under the Court' s order, arid we acknowledge that that
is so, but think it should be noted that the plaintiff is

carryi~

out the difficult task of attempting to rear four children who
have been through six extremely traumatic years, and although he
is living in the home without paying any interest or rent to the
defendant, he is nonetheless to the very best of his ability
attempting to provide the children with the necessities of life,
and to the extent that he is able, the extras such as music lessons, and to deprive the children of money which they presently
need in order to build a large fund for the defendant is, we
believe, wholly unjustified.
Pursuant to the Court's order of March 26, 1980, the
parties have invested $82,320.22 ($97,320.22 less $15,000 which
was withdrawn by defendant pursuant to said court order) in a
six month money market certificate at United Savings & Loan
Association.

This money was invested on April 24, 1980, bears
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an in~erest rate of 11.892% per annum and will thus earn interest
as of October 24, 1980, in the sum of $4,894, which sum is available for disposition by this court, or as it may direct.

(R534,

53 5) •

POINT III.

THE AWARD OF $10,205 TO THE PLAINTIFF'S PARENTS WAS

PROPER AS FAR AS IT GOES, BUT IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN REPAID IN FULL
($13,205) FROM THE $97,320.22 FUND.
We think that from the evidence there can be no doubt
that the plaintiff's parents loaned to the parties at least the
sum of $13,205 during the approximately six years prior to trial.
Exhibit 1-P shows checks paid by the plaintiff's parents to the
plaintiff in the sum of $5, 105.

Even if checks number 4141 and

4303 are excluded because one of them has the work "gift" written
on it and the other one has the word "xmas" written on it, it
leaves a sum of $4,805.

In addition the plaintiff's parents

advanced $1,500 for painting and repairs to the home and loaned
plaintiff $3,000 for dental work.

Groceries were provided for

18 months at a figure of at least $200 per month for a total of
$3,600, and in additional groceries were provided for another six
months at a minimum figure of $50 per month for a total of $300,
making a total of $13,205.

Of this the Court allowed $10,205,

and presumably therefore did not allow the $3,000 for dental
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work.

We believe that that omission was unjustified and that the

full amount of $13,205 should be allowed.
The only evidence before the Court was that those moneys
were to be paid by plaintiff to his parents as soon as he was able
Certainly as to the moneys loaned after defendant's accident, it
was clear from the evidence that the plaintiff would not be able
to repay those sums except from the settlement of the lawsuit in
which both plaintiff and defendant were joint plaintiffs.

It seems

clear that defendant's accident likewise made it impossible to
sooner repay the $3,000 dental loan until such time as the

settl~

ment was achieved because additional expenses to the family created
too much of a burden on plaintiff.
1

The trial court found that although the transaction was
negotiated between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's father, that
the plaintiff, defendant and the children were the beneficiaries
of those sums, and there is

no

evidence to the contrary.

It

therefore seems inexcapable that equity requires that that sum
be repaid.

We believe that it should be paid from the personal

injury settlement, but at the very least, the order of the Court
ordering that each of the parties assume one-half of that obligation should not be disturbed by this court.
The defendant asserts four reasons why she ·feels that
she should not be required to participate in that obligation.

We

would like to treat each one briefly:
1.

As stated at page 9 of defendant's brief, the first
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reason is that " . . . the liability, is supported at best by
a moral obligation to repay which is not consideration for an
obligation."
We desire to point out that even if it were only a moral
obligation, it would be entirely appropriate for the Court to
award the plaintiff in the divorce· settl'.e~rrent sufficient funds
out of the marital assets with which to pay that obligation.
In other words, in apportioning the assets between the plaintiff and the defendant, the Court is not limited in making that
award based upon "legal obligations."

The Court is at liberty

to divide the assets of the parties in such manner as equity
indicates.

If it is proper for the plaintiff to honor his obli-

gation to his parents, whether legal or moral, the Court is not
precluded from awarding him sufficient funds with which to do
that.

(The form of the award is secondary.)
Nevertheless, we believe the evidence overwhelmingly

indicates that it is a legal obligation.

The understanding

between the plaintiff and his father was that he would repay
it when he was able, and the loans were to be repaid from the
malpractice settlement money.
It appears to be uniformly held that a "promise to pay
when the promissor is able" is enforceable.

Some courts take the

position that such promise is absolutely enforceable, subject
only to the condition that the promissor be given a reasonable
time in which to perform.

Other courts hold that such a promise
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is enforceable at such time as the promissor is able to pay.
See In Re Clover's Estate, 237 P2d 391 (Kansas, 1951), and 94
ALR 721, on the question of ability to :e:-aY. "when able."

See also

17 Am Jur 2d, Contracts, Section 80.
2.

The defendant claims at page 19 of her brief:

"The obligation is a gift."

We believe that from what we have

heretofore pointed out, that is obviously not the case.

The rnon~

was furnished to the plaintiff upon the understanding that it would
be repaid, and that is clearly inconsistent with the notion of a
gift.

It is true that the father had on occasion provided other

sums to the plaintiff, particularly cash sums of under $25, of
which no record was kept, and the plaintiff's father undoubtedly
would have

p~ovided

more if he had been able to do so.

But those

considerations do not prevent the larger transactions from being
loans, as was testified to by both the plaintiff and his father.
3.

The defendant asserts that the claim was barred by

the statute of limitations.

As an affirmative defense, this shoul

have been raised in defendant's pleadings prior to trial to give
plaintiff notice of this assertion.

Nevertheless we respectfully

submit that the defendant is in error for at least the following
reasons:

First of all, the statute of limitations would not begin

to run until the debt became due inasmuch as the understanding
between the parties was that the debt would have to be repaid when
the plaintiff was able to pay it, and that contemplated a settle-
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ment of the malpractice action.

We believe that the debt as

understood by the parties did not become due until the malpractice
action was settled, which was at or about the time of the trial in
1979.
It should be noted that in a contract payable when a
person is able, it has been held that the statute of limitations
does not begin to run until the promissor becomes able to pay.
See In Re Clover's Estate, supra.
The statute of limitations on the debts evidenced by
checks would be six years and that in no instance would that time
period have run as of the time of the trial.as the checks were
dated 1974 or later.

Furthermore).. the loans from plaintiff'·s

father to the plaintiff constituted a series of transactions
starting in 1973 and continuing thru to the time of the trial.
Thus, as to the items not evidenced by a writing, we
UCA, 1953,
believe Section 78-12-25/would apply, which states:
"An action upon a contract, obligation or liability
not founded upon an instrument in writing; also upon an
open account for goods, wares and merchandise, and for
any article charged in a store account; also on an open
account for work, labor or services rendered, or materials furnished; provided, that action in all of the
foregoing cases may be commenced at any time within
four years after the last charge is made or the last
payment is received."
(Emphasis added.)
Further, if indeed defendant has been mentally incompetent since 1973 (a legal guardian was appointed for her the day
before the trial (R293)), Section 78-12-36, Utah Code Annotated,
1953, provides that the period of time a party is "mentally
-43- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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incompetent and without a legal guardian" is not included within
the period of the statute of limitations.

The Court found, and

the evidence is unconflicting that the moneys loaned were for
family expenses and therefore we believe that this section would
be applicable.
The defendant apparently takes the position that the
obligation to the parents is not enforceable because it does not
fall within Section 30-2-9, UCA, 1953, which states:
"The expenses of the family and the education of
the children are chargeable upon the property of both
husband and wife or either of them, and in relation
thereto they m~y be sued jointly or separately."
We believe that the expenditures referred to, being for groceries,
for the family, clothing, medical expense, and other expenses of
household, clearly falls within that .statute.

It is difficult to

imagine an indebtedness which more clearly meets the requirements
of that statute.

It should be observed, however, in thatconnec-

tion that even if this indebtedness were not a family expense,
but rather were solely the indebtedness of the plaintiff, it
would still be appropriate for the Court to make the order which
was made.

The divorce courts of this state are empowered to

divide the assets and apportion the indebtedness of the parties
in such manner as is equitable.

Whether or not those debts are

those of the plaintiff, or those of the plaintiff and the defendant, is really immaterial.

It is likewise immaterial whether the

money was used for medical expenses for the defendant, for medical
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expenses for the plaintiff, or for other household expenses such
as food and the like, all are proper family expenditures.
4.

Defendant asserts that the evidence was insuffi-

cient to establish the amount of the debt.

We submit that the

debt was established by uncontroverted testimony, and the amount
was established with reasonable certainty, and this is all that
the law requires.

See 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages, Section 25, and

see also Howarth v. Ostergaard, 30 Ut 2d 183, 515 P2d 442 (1973).
Finally, at page 13 the defendant asserts that, since
the plaintiff's parents were not parties to the action, no award
should have been made to them.

It should be noted that the Court

has not made an award to the par en ts.

The Court has made an order,

as it frequently does, as between the parties as to which of the
parties will discharge a certain obligation.
entitled to do.

This the Court was

The Court stated at paragraph 13 of the Supple-

mental Decree: "The indebtedness of the parties to the plaintiff's
parents should be repaid in the amount of $10,205, and it is
ordered that each of the parties assume and pay one-half of said
amount and hold the other harmless from said one-half."
We believe that it is worth noting that the defendant apparently takes the position that the malpractice settlement
is entirely hers, and at the same time takes the position that the
money loaned by the parents to the plaintiff, but used for the
family, is entirely plaintiff's responsibility.

There appears to

us to be a very significant inconsistency in this kind of reasoning.
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with respect to the cases cited by defendant in her
Point II, we desire to note:
Manwill v. Oyler, 11 Ut 2d 433, 361 P2d 177 (1961),
does not help defendant.

Manwill requires that "promisee expected

to be compensated" and that requirement is clearly met in the
instant case.
Mace v. Tingey, 106 Ut 420, 149 P2d 832 (1944), is distinguishable from the instant case.

In Tingey the parties to the

transaction were not able to testify to their intent as one of
them was dead and the other was presumably barred by the dead
man statute.

In the instant case both-parties were available

and did testify that the parents were to be ·repaid by the plaintiff when he was able.
Because separate debts of the parties (as well as their
joint debts) are proper subjects for equitable apportionment in
a divorce case,

(at least where, as in the instant case, they are

reasonable and proper) the cases cited by defendant at page lSof
her brief dealing with the family expense doctrine do not appear
to be relevant.

They are Berow v. Shields, 48 Ut 270, 159 P 538

(1916), and Gilman v. Matthews, 20 Colo. App. 170, 77 P 366 (1904),
For the same reason, Walker Brothers Dry Goods Co. v.
Whitehall, 61 Ut 259, 212 P 523 (1923), cited by the defendant is
not applicable.
vant in a

If the debt is owed by one spouse, it is irrele-

divorce case that the statute of limitations has run

against the other.

Further, as rioted above, defendant's incapac~
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would appear to toll the statute of limitations as to defendant
in any case.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff respectfully
requests that the court confirm the lower court in awarding a
divorce to the plaintiff (as well as the defendant).

In addition

plaintiff asks this court to direct that the parties repay to
plaintiff's parents the full amount of $13,205 from the malpractice award, or at least that it be pa-id one-half by each of the
parties, and finally the plaintiff

ask~

this court to hold that

no lien against the home be awarded to the defendant, and that
thus the equity in the home of the parties be awarded in full
to the plaintiff.

Respectfully submitted:

ROBERT C. CUMMINGS
GORDON A. MADSEN
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